



USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER
CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Issue No. 352, 7 July 2004

Articles & Other Documents:

[Port Security Rules No Sure Deterrent](#)

[Command of WMD Hunt Changes in Military Move](#)

[Inside The Ring](#)

[Iranians Gassed By Saddam Want Their Woes Aired](#)

[Distinct Signature Found In '01 Anthrax](#)

[Israeli Web Site On Nuclear Programs Offers Little That Is New](#)

[U.S. Removed Radioactive Materials From Iraq Facility](#)

[Israeli Nuclear Foe Still Fighting](#)

[Pentagon To Expand Its Anthrax Vaccinations](#)

[Poisoned Iraqi City Still Waits For Help](#)

[C.I.A. Held Back Iraqi Arms Data, U.S. Officials Say](#)

[Chemicals Not Found In Iraq Warheads](#)

[Nation Test-Launches Nuclear-Capable Rocket](#)

[Blair Says Illicit Weapons May Never Be Found, But 'We Know' Hussein Had Them](#)

[Israel Tries to Shift Focus During U.N. Visit](#)

Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.

Established in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm for in-depth information and specific points of contact. Please direct any questions or comments on CPC Outreach Journal Jo Ann Eddy, CPC Outreach Editor, at (334) 953-7538 or DSN 493-7538. To subscribe, change e-mail address, or unsubscribe to this journal or to request inclusion on the mailing list for CPC publications, please contact Mrs. Eddy.

The following articles, papers or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or other US government agencies. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved

Washington Times
June 30, 2004

Port Security Rules No Sure Deterrent

By Jen Haberkorn, The Washington Times

Port security officials said yesterday that new rules taking effect tomorrow are no guarantee against a terrorist attack in the country's waterways but are an improvement over security of three years ago.

The regulations will require ports and ships entering any international port to show proof of emergency plans and having met security standards set by the United Nations.

U.S. ports, which will comply with the international regulations, will be able to detect a threat, such as a "dirty bomb," but not necessarily be able stop one, said Asa Hutchinson, Department of Homeland Security undersecretary for border and transportation security.

"Is it possible for a radiological device [dirty bomb] to get through ...? There always can be a means," Mr. Hutchinson said. "But I believe we have the systems in place, and it's our job to make sure those systems work."

Under the new guidelines, ports will have additional law enforcement, ID checks, canine teams, surveillance cameras and background checks. Some of the new procedures are already in place. Beginning tomorrow, no one will be able to enter the Port of Baltimore without a port pass or photo ID, said Jim White, executive director of the Maryland Port Administration. Before the September 11 attacks, a majority of ports nationwide could be entered with a friendly wave of the hand, Mr. White said. The port has also installed surveillance cameras.

According to Coast Guard statistics, implementing the security plan in the United States will cost \$7.3 billion over "a number of years," said Philip J. Crowley, senior fellow and director of national defense and homeland security at the Center for American Progress. Agencies involved in the plan include the Coast Guard and Department of Homeland Security, as well as port and ship owners.

Carl Bentzel, senior Democratic counsel on the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee, said enforcement is a problem, specifically the reliance on documents verifying cargo and safety facilities.

Cargo is examined based on manifest data provided by the ship's employees, which could prove false, Mr. Bentzel said.

"If you rely on paper [for security] — that goes for cargo and for facilities in ports — some crime has to occur before we actually have the posture that will allow us to be secure."

Joe Cox, president of the Chamber of Shipping of America, which represents trade ships and vessels, is more optimistic.

"No ship is going to come into the United States on July 1 that doesn't have a certificate attesting to its security preparedness," Mr. Cox said. A noncomplying ship could enter a U.S. port without a certificate but would face tighter security.

"We just give it a little more scrutiny and ask that they follow certain procedures to make sure that that ship remains secure when they're at a port that's not secure overseas," said Rear Adm. Larry Hereth, director of port security of the Coast Guard.

A percentage of cargo will be inspected, said Coast Guard spokeswoman Jolie Shifflet. The percentage, which is not released to the public, will vary depending on a maritime security threat level, similar to the United States' color-coded Homeland Security Advisory System.

The Coast Guard will work with the world's noncomplying ports on compliance.

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

New York Times

July 1, 2004

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

Pentagon To Expand Its Anthrax Vaccinations

By Thom Shanker

WASHINGTON, June 30 — The Pentagon announced a major expansion of its vaccination program with a new order on Wednesday requiring that anthrax and smallpox vaccine be administered to all soldiers and essential civilians in the Middle East and, for the first time, to troops in South Korea.

The announcement will affect tens of thousands of full-time troops and reservists, Pentagon officials said. It comes six months after the Defense Department resumed anthrax vaccinations when a federal judge lifted a restraining order that had temporarily halted the program.

Pentagon officials said the decision resulted from an increased supply of vaccine, and not from indications of an increased threat of biological or chemical attacks. Even so, these officials also said their concerns that an adversary might attack troops with such unconventional weapons were undiminished.

William Winkenwerder Jr., the assistant secretary of defense for health affairs, said the Pentagon had given anthrax shots to 1.1 million people since 1998. Since December 2002, more than 625,000 Pentagon and military personnel have been vaccinated against smallpox.

A significant portion of American troops in the Middle East have received the vaccines. But the expanded program will require all military personnel and essential civilian contractors to receive the shots if they serve in the Central Command area, which stretches from the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea. And for the first time, American troops in South Korea will have to be vaccinated, along with some in the Pacific.

Bryan Whitman, the Pentagon's deputy spokesman, said, "Anthrax and smallpox remain two of the top biological warfare threats to our forces, and vaccinations remain a safe and reliable way to protect our service members."

Brig. Gen. David Rodriguez, deputy director for operations on the military's joint staff, said it was "not that relatively difficult" to employ anthrax as a weapon, and he cited C.I.A. assessments that Al Qaeda has pursued biological weapons.

Although Pentagon policy states that the anthrax vaccine is safe and effective, the inoculation program has been the subject of a court battle. In January, a federal judge lifted an injunction halting mandatory anthrax vaccination, allowing the Pentagon to resume giving shots to any troops except the six anonymous people who brought the suit. In issuing his preliminary injunction on Dec. 22, the judge, Emmet G. Sullivan of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, accepted the plaintiffs' arguments that the vaccine used in the Pentagon's program had been approved by the Food and Drug Administration to protect against skin exposure to anthrax, but not against anthrax that is inhaled, a far greater threat.

Thus, the judge said, the vaccine was an "investigational" drug being forced on the troops for an unapproved purpose.

The Pentagon halted the program while the Justice Department filed a motion asking the judge to withdraw the injunction, or at least limit his ruling to the six plaintiffs.

On Dec. 30, the F.D.A. announced a new "final rule and order" that officially declared the anthrax vaccine effective against the inhaled form of the bacteria. The Justice Department then filed an emergency motion asking Judge Sullivan to lift the injunction.

Although Judge Sullivan was swayed by government lawyers' arguments and stayed his injunction, he wrote that the timing of a new F.D.A. rule raised suspicions.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/01/politics/01ANTH.html?pagewanted=all>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Los Angeles Times

July 1, 2004

THE CONFLICT IN IRAQ

Command of WMD Hunt Changes in Military Move

■ Marine general takes over daily responsibility in search for Hussein's alleged banned arms

From Associated Press

WASHINGTON — The military officer running the hunt for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq has been replaced in what officials described as a routine rotation.

Brig. Gen. Joseph J. McMnamin, a Marine, took over as director of the Iraq Survey Group on June 12. He replaced Maj. Gen. Keith Dayton, who moved to a Pentagon job in the Army's hierarchy, according to the Pentagon.

McMnamin runs day-to-day operations and reports to Charles Duelfer, who has the title of special advisor and sets strategy for the weapons hunt. Duelfer reports to CIA Director George J. Tenet, who is leaving his post this month.

The dozens of teams on the Iraq Survey Group have been conducting a largely fruitless hunt for evidence of Saddam Hussein's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs. Those alleged programs served as the Bush administration's chief stated reason for going to war.

The survey group combines personnel from the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, military special operations forces and others.

A report from the Iraq Survey Group is expected in August.

Dayton becomes director of strategy, plans and policy under the deputy chief of staff for operations at Army headquarters.

McMnamin, who was commissioned in 1974, previously headed the Marine Corps basic training center at Parris Island, S.C.

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-wmds1jul01,1,3096642.story?coll=la-headlines-world>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Chicago Tribune

July 1, 2004

Poisoned Iraqi City Still Waits For Help

Saddam Hussein's trial means little to victims of 1988 chemical attack

By Aamer Madhani, Tribune staff reporter

HALABJA, Iraq -- Like many others in this small Kurdish city who survived the most notorious chemical attack by Saddam Hussein's regime, Hamida Hassen Muhammad suffers from the distinctive raw cough that physicians say plagues the community.

Each day the 36-year-old widow wakes up hacking, and by the end of the day she finds herself spitting blood into her kitchen sink. The mustard gas used in the attack damaged her lungs, making even walking across her small home exhausting.

"It feels like the blade of a knife is scratching the inside of my neck when I breathe and when I eat," said Muhammad, who also suffered burns to her legs and stomach. "I have no money to get proper treatment. I am just waiting for my death."

The 1988 chemical attack in the northern Iraqi town killed 5,000 people and left thousands of survivors blind, lame and with irreparable damage to their respiratory systems. And while the residents say they feel forgotten, their suffering is expected to loom large on Thursday when the deposed dictator is due to appear before an Iraqi judge to hear the charges he faces for crimes he allegedly committed during his rule.

The attack, purportedly carried out at Hussein's command, was perhaps the regime's single most heinous act, said State Minister Kasim Daoud. "It demonstrated his savagery," Daoud said.

On Wednesday, Hussein was served with a warrant for his arrest, and his legal custody, along with that of 11 of his most senior deputies, was transferred to the Iraqi government. He is to remain in U.S. military custody for the time being but will be tried in an Iraqi court.

Salem Chalabi, head of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, told ABC television that Hussein was "visibly nervous" as he was served the warrant. Chalabi said Hussein appeared to have lost weight and his hair was a "a bit long."

"The whole process took maybe three or four minutes," Chalabi said.

The U.S.-led coalition also has cited the attack on Halabja as evidence that Hussein had the ability to obtain and the propensity to use weapons of mass destruction, the U.S. administration's foremost stated reason for invading Iraq.

'No one is listening'

Although the coalition has pointed to Halabja to symbolize Hussein's cruelty, Halabja's residents complain that the international community has done little to address the long-term health effects on the survivors.

"No one is listening to us, but they know our problems," said Kamal Abdul Kadi, 31, who lost a third of his lung tissue as a result of being exposed in the attack. "No one from the Americans or the international community is coming to confront our problems."

More than 40 percent of Halabja survivors suffer from serious respiratory illnesses, such as asthma, bronchitis and lung fibrosis, or loss of lung tissue, according to Dr. Fouad Baban, a general surgeon in nearby Sulaymaniyah who has conducted two studies on the medical effects of the attack with the University of Liverpool and the Washington Kurdish Institute.

Baban said cancer and miscarriage rates have also skyrocketed in the city of 50,000.

Exposure to mustard gas can damage the lungs and lead to cancer, Baban said. He said many residents suffered irreparable injuries. But in many cases, their suffering could be eased by proper medical attention, which is virtually unheard of in this impoverished city.

A living reminder

"This town has been totally destroyed in terms of the people's health physically and psychologically," said Baban, who treated victims in the years after the attack. "Nothing has been done to help these people--not by the Americans, not by the international community and not by the Kurdish regional government."

After the U.S. administration made its case for invading Iraq on the grounds that Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, some Halabja residents held a glimmer of hope that the Americans would be obliged to help the Halabja survivors, said Ebrahim Hawramani, a survivor of the attack and the director of the Halabja Monument, a museum that memorializes the attack's victims.

But as time passed, Hawramani said he came to believe that it was in the U.S. administration's interest that Halabja remain as it is for the time being, a living reminder to the world of the ravages of Hussein's rule.

"America and the rest of the world has made Halabja the poster boy of chemical attacks because so many people died in Halabja," Hawramani said.

Dr. Fiaq Mohammed Gulpi, a physician in nearby Sulaymaniyah who estimated that he has treated more than 1,000 survivors of Halabja over the years, theorized that the American and other Western governments have chosen to ignore the issue because of their culpability in the attack.

The attack on Halabja came as the Iraq-Iran war was winding down. Three days before the attack, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard reached Halabja accompanied by Iraqi-Kurdish fighters who were opposed to Hussein's regime. Most of Halabja's population, in fact, sided with Iran in the war.

Then on March 16, 1988, Iraqi fighter planes leveled the village with bombs and killed and maimed those who tried to escape to the nearby Suren Mountains with mustard and nerve gases.

Gulpi noted that the U.S. government sided with Hussein during the Iraq-Iran war, and other Western governments sold the Iraqis weapons.

"Saddam is mainly responsible for Halabja, but the Americans also hold some responsibility," Gulpi said.

Before the attack, Halabja was a place where families went for picnics and children played in the streets, recalled Aras Abid Akram, 36, a social worker who survived the attacks.

But over the last 16 years, he said, the city has felt like a graveyard, with the rubble of mud-brick homes that were damaged in the bombing and scores of walking wounded serving as a constant reminder of the atrocity.

"We feel very sad every day," Akram said. "We have no reason to believe anyone will help us."

<http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-0407010227jul01.1.4739011.story>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Washington Times

July 2, 2004

Pg. 5

Inside The Ring

By Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough

Missile test

North Korea test-fired a cruise missile June 23, the latest sign of the reclusive communist state's continuing missile development.

Data from the cruise missile test still are being evaluated, said a U.S. official familiar with the test. The missile was fired from a mobile launcher near the coastal town of Tanchon in northeastern North Korea. It flew into the East Sea/Japan Sea.

The missile is believed to be a new North Korean anti-ship cruise missile, believed to have a range of 100 miles, that has been tested several times in the past. . .

Clarke and al Qaeda

Former Vice President Al Gore is not the only former Clinton administration official to criticize President Bush for touting an al Qaeda-Saddam Hussein link.

Richard A. Clarke is doing the same thing.

It should be noted that it was the Clinton administration that first publicly made the link in a 1998 Justice Department indictment of Osama bin Laden, and then a second time to justify the 1998 bombing of the al Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan.

When launching his anti-Bush book March 21, here is what former national security aide Mr. Clarke said on "60 Minutes" to Lesley Stahl:

Mrs. Stahl: Was there any connection between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda?

Mr. Clarke: Were they cooperating? No.

Mrs. Stahl: Was Iraq supporting al Qaeda?

Mr. Clarke: No. There's absolutely no evidence that Iraq was supporting al Qaeda ever.

But when Mr. Clarke was not selling books and worked in the Clinton White House, he said this to The Washington Post in 1999 to justify the al Shifa bombing.

The Post article said, "Clarke said that the U.S. government is 'sure' that Iraqi nerve gas experts actually produced a powdered VX-like substance at the plant that, when mixed with bleach and water, would have become fully active VX nerve gas. Clarke said U.S. intelligence does not know how much of the substance was produced at al Shifa or what happened to it. But he said that intelligence exists linking bin Laden to al Shifa's current and past operators, the Iraqi nerve gas experts and the National Islamic Front in Sudan.

"Given the evidence presented to the White House before the airstrike, Clarke said, the president 'would have been derelict in his duties if he didn't blow up the facility.' "

<http://www.washtimes.com/national/inring.htm>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

New York Times

July 6, 2004

Pg. 1

C.I.A. Held Back Iraqi Arms Data, U.S. Officials Say

By James Risen

WASHINGTON, July 5 — The Central Intelligence Agency was told by relatives of Iraqi scientists before the war that Baghdad's programs to develop unconventional weapons had been abandoned, but the C.I.A. failed to give that

information to President Bush, even as he publicly warned of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's illicit weapons, according to government officials.

The existence of a secret prewar C.I.A. operation to debrief relatives of Iraqi scientists — and the agency's failure to give their statements to the president and other policymakers — has been uncovered by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. The panel has been investigating the government's handling of prewar intelligence on Iraq's unconventional weapons and plans to release a wide-ranging report this week on the first phase of its inquiry. The report is expected to contain a scathing indictment of the C.I.A. and its leaders for failing to recognize that the evidence they had collected did not justify their assessment that Mr. Hussein had illicit weapons.

C.I.A. officials, saying that only a handful of relatives made claims that the weapons programs were dead, play down the significance of the information collected in the secret debriefing operation. That operation is one of a number of significant disclosures by the Senate investigation. The Senate report, intelligence officials say, concludes that the agency and the rest of the intelligence community did a poor job of collecting information about the status of Iraq's weapons programs, and that analysts at the C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies did an even worse job of writing reports that accurately reflected the information they had.

Among the many problems that contributed to the committee's harsh assessment of the C.I.A.'s prewar performance were instances in which analysts may have misrepresented information, writing reports that distorted evidence in order to bolster their case that Iraq did have chemical, biological and nuclear programs, according to government officials. The Senate found, for example, that an Iraqi defector who supposedly provided evidence of the existence of a biological weapons program had actually said he did not know of any such program.

In another case concerning whether a shipment of aluminum tubes seized on its way to Iraq was evidence that Baghdad was trying to build a nuclear bomb, the Senate panel raised questions about whether the C.I.A. had become an advocate, rather than an objective observer, and selectively sought to prove that the tubes were for a nuclear weapons program.

While the Senate panel has concluded that C.I.A. analysts and other intelligence officials overstated the case that Iraq had illicit weapons, the committee has not found any evidence that the analysts changed their reports as a result of political pressure from the White House, according to officials familiar with the report.

The Senate report is expected to criticize both the director of central intelligence, George J. Tenet, and his deputy, John McLaughlin, and other senior C.I.A. officials, for the way they managed the agency before the war. Mr. Tenet has announced his resignation, effective July 11, and Mr. McLaughlin will serve as acting director until a permanent director is appointed. The C.I.A. has scheduled a farewell ceremony for Mr. Tenet on Thursday, just as the reverberations from the Senate report are likely to be hitting the agency.

The possibility that Mr. Tenet personally overstated the evidence has been investigated by the Senate panel, officials said. He was interviewed privately by the panel recently, and was asked whether he told President Bush that the case for the existence of Iraq's unconventional weapons was a "slam dunk."

In his book about the Bush administration's planning for the war in Iraq, "Plan of Attack," Bob Woodward reported that Mr. Tenet reassured Mr. Bush about the evidence of the existence of Iraq's illicit weapons after Mr. Bush had made clear he was unimpressed by the evidence presented to him in a December 2002 briefing by Mr. McLaughlin. "It's a slam-dunk case!" Mr. Tenet is quoted as telling the president.

In his private interview with the Senate panel, Mr. Tenet refused to say whether he had used the "slam-dunk" phrase, arguing that his conversations with the president were privileged, officials said.

In hindsight, the Senate panel and many other intelligence officials now agree that there was little effort within the American intelligence community before the war to question the basic assumption that Mr. Hussein was still seeking to produce illicit weapons. Evidence that fit that assumption was embraced; evidence to the contrary was ignored or seen as part of a clever Iraqi disinformation campaign.

Yet there were some people inside the intelligence community who recognized the need for better evidence, according to intelligence officials. In 1998, the United Nations withdrew its weapons inspectors from Iraq, severely hampering the C.I.A.'s ability to monitor Iraqi weapons efforts. In response, Charlie Allen, the agency's assistant director for collection, began searching for new sources of information, the intelligence officials said.

He pushed for several new collection programs, including one that called for approaching members of the families of Iraqi scientists believed to be involved in secret weapons programs, the officials said. At the time, the C.I.A. had no direct access to important Iraqi scientists, and using family members as intermediaries seemed like the next best thing.

Beginning in 2000, the C.I.A. contacted the relatives and asked them what they knew or could learn about the work being conducted by the scientists. Officials would not say how or where the relatives were contacted.

The relatives told the agency that the scientists had said that they were no longer working on illicit weapons, and that those programs were dead. Yet the statements from the relatives were never included in C.I.A. intelligence reports on Iraq that were distributed throughout the government. C.I.A. analysts monitoring Iraq apparently ignored

the statements from the family members and continued to issue assessments that Mr. Hussein was still developing unconventional weapons, Senate investigators have found.

At the time, C.I.A. analysts were deeply cynical about statements from Iraqis suggesting that Mr. Hussein had no illicit weapons, and assumed that such talk was simply part of an Iraqi denial and deception program, several intelligence officials said.

In response, a C.I.A. spokesman said, the families' statements were "not at all convincing."

"There was nothing definitive about it," the spokesman said. "No useful information was collected from the family members, and that's why it wouldn't have been disseminated."

The agency's handling of intelligence on biological weapons has also drawn Congressional criticism. In fact, the C.I.A. relied heavily on four Iraqi defectors to reach its conclusion that Iraq had developed mobile biological weapons laboratories.

But one defector, an Iraqi scientist, said he had been working on a technical program known as a "protein slurry," and that his work was unrelated to biological weapons. He said he did not know of any other biological weapons activity under way in Iraq. Senate investigators did not discover that his statements contradicted the view that Iraq had an active biological program until they read the original reports of his debriefings from before the war, officials said. A C.I.A. official said the agency still had good reasons to use the defector's information, and has been trying to explain that to the Senate committee. The official would not elaborate.

There were problems with the handling of the other defectors used to buttress the biological weapons case.

Information from one was used even though the Defense Intelligence Agency had warned in the spring of 2002 that he had fabricated information. The C.I.A. took statements that another defector had given to German intelligence without knowing his identity or learning that he had ties to the Iraqi National Congress, the Iraqi exile group led by Ahmad Chalabi. Mr. Chalabi, until recently a close ally of the Pentagon, fell into disfavor with the Bush administration after it became clear that his organization had provided disinformation to the United States and had exaggerated the threat posed by Mr. Hussein.

One of the most sensitive elements of the Senate investigation relates to the C.I.A.'s handling of intelligence about the shipment of aluminum tubes seized by the United States in 2001 on its way into Iraq.

Senior C.I.A. analysts became convinced that the shipment was strong evidence that Mr. Hussein was reconstituting his nuclear weapons program. The agency concluded that the aluminum tubes were to be used as spinning rotors in a centrifuge that could enrich uranium for bombs.

But other government experts, particularly at the national laboratories and in the State Department, were skeptical. They argued that the tubes seemed designed for use in conventional military rockets.

The technical debate reached a peak in 2002, just as the intelligence community was preparing a comprehensive National Intelligence Estimate, an interagency assessment of the status of Iraq's unconventional weapons.

Seeking to prove its case, the C.I.A. hired outside experts to conduct technical tests, spinning the tubes at high speeds to determine whether they could withstand the stress of a centrifuge.

But the Senate panel investigated the way in which the C.I.A. selectively sought to prove its case with the outside experts in the face of the skepticism from analysts at other agencies. For example, in the National Intelligence Estimate, the C.I.A. disclosed the initial — and successful — test results to support its assertion that the tubes could be used to help produce nuclear weapons. Only later did the C.I.A. report results that showed that the tubes ultimately failed in testing.

C.I.A. officials said in response that only the initial test results were reported in the intelligence assessment because those were the only results available at the time. When later results were available in January 2003, they were reported to the rest of the intelligence community, the officials said. The C.I.A. officials added that nearly all of the subsequent test failures were a result of failures of testing equipment, and that the few failures of tubes were at speeds that exceeded those required for centrifuges. The agency had asked the outside experts to push the tubes to their limits in the stress tests, and so their failure did not mean that the tubes could not be used in a centrifuge, the C.I.A. officials say.

The C.I.A.'s views on the tubes ultimately prevailed inside the Bush administration. Although the State Department's own analysts issued a dissent in the National Intelligence Estimate, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell went with the C.I.A. In his presentation to the United Nations in February 2003 laying out the administration's case against Iraq, he relied on the aluminum tubes to show that Mr. Hussein was rebuilding his nuclear weapons program.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/06/politics/06INTE.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Iranians Gassed By Saddam Want Their Woes Aired

By Borzou Daragahi, The Washington Times

TEHRAN — A year before Saddam Hussein etched Halabja, Iraq, in history as a place of infamy and horror, he conducted a trial run in the Iranian town Sardasht. Its residents are still waiting to see him answer for it.

"The greatest aspect of this crime was the silence we heard from both Iran and the international community,"

Hossein Mohammadian, a 44-year-old survivor of the Sardasht bombing, said in a telephone interview from his hometown.

"If this court trying Saddam is to be a just and humane court and not be a tool for political and economic interests, it must include Sardasht."

On March 28, 1987, Saddam's forces dropped seven 550-pound bombs containing mustard gas on a civilian population of 20,000, inflicting lifelong trauma on its inhabitants.

"This was definitely a crime," said Shariar Khateri, a physician dedicated to treating the victims of chemical weapons used during the Iran-Iraq war.

Iranian officials have already begun preparing a case against Saddam for crimes during the Iran-Iraq war to present to the special tribunal now meeting in Baghdad.

Among the seven charges filed against Saddam last week were the chemical bombardment of Halabja in eastern Iraq and Iraq's invasion and attempted annexation of Kuwait. Salem Chalabi, executive director of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, said there was still time to add more charges, such as Sardasht.

"The hearing [last week] was one in which just some of the principal — though not exclusive — charges were laid out," he said in response to an e-mail inquiry.

Mr. Mohammadian recalls it was about 4 p.m. when the planes flew over Sardasht. Four bombs hit the center of the city and another three hit the outskirts of the loosely knit Kurdish town in the foothills of the Zagros Mountains. He smelled something strange and ran home to gather up his family. They packed into a beaten Land Rover and headed out of the city.

"Saddam Hussein used a mixture of mustard gas and some very hazardous material like silica, which made them more dangerous agents," said Dr. Khateri, who conducts his research under the auspices of the Tehran-based Society for Chemical Weapons Victims Support.

Mr. Mohammadian managed to get out of the city when he was stuck by blindness and found he had trouble breathing. He and others were rushed to Tehran for treatment, but he continues to suffer to this day.

Some 6,000 residents of the town — one-third of the 1987 population — continue to suffer from mustard-gas poisoning, which is more often debilitating than fatal.

The use of such weapons, whether on civilians or soldiers, is banned under several international treaties, including the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

Bringing the matter up at Saddam's trial could at least force him to explain the bombing.

"It's been 17 years," said Mr. Mohammadian, who today heads a nonprofit advocacy group and is the author of a book chronicling the bombing. "Even if the international community would just acknowledge what happened, we'd be grateful."

<http://www.washtimes.com/world/20040705-101902-5793r.htm>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Chemicals Not Found In Iraq Warheads

By Walter Pincus, Washington Post Staff Writer

Sixteen rocket warheads found last week in south-central Iraq by Polish troops did not contain deadly chemicals, a coalition spokesman said yesterday, but U.S. and Polish officials agreed that insurgents loyal to former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein and foreign terrorist fighters are trying to buy such old weapons or purchase the services of Iraqi scientists who know how to make them.

The Coalition Press Information Center in Baghdad said in a statement yesterday that the 122-milimeter rocket rounds, which initially showed traces of sarin, "were all empty and tested negative for any type of chemicals." The statement came just hours after two senior Polish defense officials told reporters in Warsaw, based on preliminary

reports, that the rocket rounds contained deadly sarin and that actions by the Polish unit in Iraq kept them from being purchased by militants fighting coalition forces.

Yesterday's coalition release also said that two other 122-milimeter rounds, found by the Poles on June 16 with help from an Iraqi informer, tested positive for small quantities of sarin but were "so deteriorated" that they would have had "limited to no impact if used by insurgents against coalition forces."

The Poles' discoveries generated renewed talk that prewar claims about Hussein's stock of unconventional weapons might yet prove true. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, for example, told an interviewer on Wednesday that the Polish defense minister, Jerzy Szmajdzinski, told him about the weapons last weekend at the NATO meeting in Turkey. Though Rumsfeld made it clear he had no personal knowledge of test results, he said that the Poles "believe that they are correct that these, in fact, were undeclared chemical weapons -- sarin and mustard gas."

Szmajdzinski told Polish radio that the rockets and mortars had probably been hidden from United Nations inspectors. "Our predictions and reports that Saddam Hussein did not come clean with a large sum of weapons, artillery shells and of weapons of mass destruction were proven true," he said. "Some of those warheads were old, but it could not be ruled out some could still be used."

Charles Duelfer, the chief U.S. weapons inspector in Iraq, told Fox News on June 24 that "some" old sarin and mustard rounds have been discovered in scattered places, demonstrating "that the Iraqi declarations were wrong at least in . . . amount." But Duelfer cautioned he was not ready to make any judgment whether there were any "still concealed" military-capable stockpiles.

Duelfer said the current danger he sees is that some anti-coalition forces and foreign terrorist groups are trying to tap into Iraq's weapons expertise for use against the United States. "Former experts in [Hussein's] weapons-of-mass-destruction program," he said, "are being recruited by anti-coalition groups." As a result, he said, his Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) is "keeping a very close eye on some anti-regime people."

In Warsaw yesterday, Marek Dukaczewski, Poland's chief of army intelligence, told reporters: "We were mortified by the information that terrorists were looking for these warheads. . . . An attack with such weapons would be hard to imagine."

Dukaczewski said the Polish unit in Iraq paid an undisclosed sum of money to buy the rockets last month after an informer there told the Poles that militant groups were seeking to buy such weapons for up to \$5,000 apiece. "We bought all the shells available," Dukaczewski said.

In Washington yesterday, a senior intelligence official said he was unaware that the Poles purchased rather than found the weapons. He said the United States had been told they were discovered at several sites, mixed in with conventional 122-milimeter rockets and without any distinctive markings.

Duelfer, who as CIA Director George J. Tenet's personal representative directs the ISG's weapons search, told Fox News that the rocket rounds were found in former depots but that so far "we're not able to establish how these rounds got to where we found them" or "who had custody of them, if anyone."

In January 2003, U.N. inspectors discovered a dozen old 122-milimeter rockets that chief inspector Hans Blix described at the time as "designed to carry chemical weapons." Iraq later turned up several more, and all were destroyed. Blix later said he was not sure whether Iraq mentioned them in the 12,000-page weapons declaration it submitted in December 2002.

Correspondent Craig Whitlock in Berlin contributed to this report.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A24403-2004Jul2.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Baltimore Sun

July 4, 2004

Distinct Signature Found In '01 Anthrax

Discovery raises hope that source can be traced

By Scott Shane, Sun National Staff

In a possible break for the FBI's investigation of the anthrax letters of 2001, scientists have discovered that the mailed anthrax was a mix of two slightly different samples, giving the bacteria a distinct signature that might make it easier to match with a source, according to two non-government experts who have been told of the finding.

The discovery that bacteria taken from the letters all grew in the double pattern was made at least a year ago, and it is not known whether the FBI's hunt for a matching sample has succeeded. The bureau and its scientific consultants are screening dozens of anthrax samples collected all over the United States and in some foreign countries, seeking the closest match to the spores used in the attack, according to a scientist who advises the FBI.

The revelation of the double pattern of the mailed anthrax comes as the FBI is due Tuesday to give a Washington judge a secret progress report on the investigation the bureau calls Amerithrax, which is well into its third year without visible results.

The FBI progress report, requested in March by U.S. District Judge Reggie B. Walton, is likely to be less about old-fashioned police work than newfangled science, according to statements made in court by FBI and Justice Department officials. The case of the anthrax-laced letters that killed five people and sickened at least 17 others in 2001 has become the first major test of an emerging scientific discipline called bioforensics, the use of genetic analysis and other modern laboratory tools to track germs used in an attack back to their origin.

FBI spokeswoman Debra Weierman declined last week to discuss the investigation, except to say that tests on the anthrax powder have not been completed. But experts on the fast-developing science of biological sleuthing say it should by now have helped the bureau to substantially narrow the search.

"I think we have the science now to trace the anthrax to a particular lab," said Babetta L. Marrone, a cell biologist at the Los Alamos National Laboratories and a member of an FBI advisory group on bioforensics.

Still, she says, finding the source lab will not by itself identify a perpetrator, only reduce the number of potential suspects. "If I had to guess, I'd say what has the FBI stumped is the non-scientific stuff," Marrone said.

Walton is presiding over a lawsuit filed by former Army biowarfare expert Dr. Steven J. Hatfill, who says the government wrecked his career and upended his life with a deliberate campaign of leaks falsely suggesting that he was the anthrax mailer. Hatfill's lawyers want to obtain FBI documents and question government officials to support his claims.

In successfully seeking to put on hold Hatfill's lawsuit and another filed by the widow of a Florida anthrax victim, the FBI claimed in court early this year that the investigation was at a "critical stage" and that the litigation could endanger investigators' work.

Impressive effort

An affidavit filed by FBI Inspector Richard L. Lambert in January described a major scientific effort to define the "specific forensic signature" of the attack anthrax.

"To forensically characterize the anthrax evidence ... the FBI has contracted with 19 government, commercial and university laboratories which are performing research, analyses and evaluations to assist the FBI Laboratory," Lambert wrote. "Most of these scientific initiatives are scheduled to be completed within the next six months. If successful, these initiatives will ... facilitate the attribution of the anthrax used in the attacks to one or more U.S. and foreign laboratories."

Of 30 FBI special agents and 13 U.S. postal inspectors working full-time on the case, officials say, eight of the FBI agents have a doctorate "in a scientific discipline related to the investigation."

"I've been impressed with the patience and perseverance of our partners in the FBI," said Claire M. Fraser, director of the Institute for Genomic Research in Rockville, a private organization that is carrying out much of the genetic analysis for the bureau.

Fraser said she could not discuss specific findings related to the investigation. But she said that after initial skepticism, she has been pleasantly surprised by the progress made in the past year in finding forensically useful ways to distinguish samples of anthrax from one another.

Still, she said genetic analysis of samples of pathogens is not nearly as advanced as the human DNA testing that has become routine in investigations of murder, rape and other crimes. "We're not even close to being at that level," she said.

Ronald Kessler, a Washington author who has written several books on the FBI, said the Amerithrax investigation represents the largest mobilization of inside and outside scientists in the bureau's history.

The emphasis on first-rate science is in part a reaction to a scandal in the 1990s that discredited some work by the FBI laboratory, Kessler said. "That definitely led to a realization that they had to get outside accreditation and hire outside scientists, not just rely on agents who had worked their way up," he said.

But the nature of the anthrax crimes - the first major bioterrorist attack on U.S. soil - is driving the reliance on research. "You're talking about inventing a new science here," Kessler said.

The finding that the attack anthrax came from a combination of two distinct samples is one small step in that new science. Like other bacteria, anthrax grown in the laboratory forms tiny colonies of bacteria that can have particular physical characteristics. Colonies from different strains or samples can be larger or smaller, have more or less uneven edges or form distinctive shapes.

While all the anthrax used in the attacks is a variant of the Ames strain, scientists found that the spores recovered from the envelopes grew into two slightly different kinds of colonies.

That might mean part of the original sample was removed from a freezer and grown for a period of days, allowing very slight genetic mutations, and then recombined with the original sample, according to the two outside experts familiar with the tests. The perpetrator might then have taken a sample from the mixed batch and used it to grow the

bacteria used in the attack. The double pattern gives the mailed anthrax one more distinctive characteristic to be compared with possible sources.

"Potentially, that could be very useful," one scientist said.

Rapid development

The developing science of bioforensics, also known as microbial forensics, encompasses far more than the genetic fingerprinting or patterns of growing colonies.

Advanced testing on samples of anthrax or other organisms can also reveal clues to the location of the water used to grow them, because isotopes of oxygen and other elements in water vary from place to place. Germs also usually carry traces of the growth medium, or nutrient mixture, used to produce them, yielding another potential clue. Some bioweapons, including anthrax spores, can contain chemical additives to permit the germs to float freely in the air. Experts who have seen the mailed anthrax have been divided on what additive it contained or whether it contained one at all.

All such markers will be studied at a bioforensics unit being created by the Department of Homeland Security as part of its planned \$200 million biodefense center at Fort Detrick in Frederick. Currently occupying temporary space at the Army's biodefense laboratory, the National Bioforensic Analysis Center will maintain a reference library of biological samples and data to be consulted in the event of a biological attack, according to written plans for the center.

Abigail A. Salyers, a University of Illinois professor who organized one of the first meetings on bioforensics while president of the American Society for Microbiology in 2002, said she has been impressed with the field's rapid development.

She's pessimistic, however, that the anthrax case will be solved. "The case would be compelling if they found in someone's apartment or home some of this same anthrax mixture," Salyers said. Nearly three years after the attacks, that's unlikely, she said.

But she said the quest is building scientific knowledge and laboratory techniques that will be critical in understanding and tracing the source of any future biological attack.

"Even if they don't solve the anthrax case, that doesn't mean it's a dead loss," Salyers said. "We've developed an awful lot of very useful information in trying to solve it."

<http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/health/bal-te.anthrax04jul04,1,102494.story>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Los Angeles Times

July 5, 2004

Nation Test-Launches Nuclear-Capable Rocket

By Times Wire Reports

India successfully fired a nuclear-capable missile off the coast of the eastern state of Orissa in what a Defense Ministry spokesman called "a routine test."

The Agni 1 missile has an estimated range of 750 miles.

India is developing an array of missiles as part of its nuclear defense strategy against neighbors China and Pakistan.

India staged nuclear tests and declared itself a nuclear power in 1998, prompting longtime rival Pakistan to respond with similar tests.

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-briefs5.3jul05,1,4513038.story>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

New York Times

July 5, 2004

Israeli Web Site On Nuclear Programs Offers Little That Is New

By Greg Myre

JERUSALEM, July 4 - Israel's Atomic Energy Commission posted a Web site on Sunday about the country's nuclear program, which has always been highly secretive, though the new site is limited to the most basic information and a few long-distance photos.

The introduction of the site came just two days before a visit by the director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei, who last week called for talks on a nuclear-free Middle East.

As noted on the new Web site (www.iaec.gov.il), Israel's Atomic Energy Commission was established in 1952 by the prime minister at the time, David Ben-Gurion. Since then, Israel has tried to say as little as possible about its

nuclear program. It has always refused to confirm or deny whether it possesses nuclear weapons, though various estimates have said the country has enough plutonium to make about 200 such weapons.

In an interview last December with the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, Dr. ElBaradei said he presumed that Israel had a nuclear arsenal.

The Web site notes that Israel has two nuclear research centers, including a nuclear reactor in the Negev Desert, outside the southern town of Dimona. There is no reference to nuclear weapons on the Web posting, which says the Dimona facility is for "expanding and deepening basic knowledge of nuclear science and related fields and providing an infrastructure for the practical and economic utilization of atomic energy."

Several photos are of nondescript buildings, with bright flowers in the foreground. One shows what appears to be the silhouette of the dome-shaped Dimona reactor at sunset, from a great distance.

The Web site, in English and Hebrew, offers just a few pages of general information that is already common knowledge. In May, Israel's equally secretive intelligence service, Mossad, posted its own Web site, which advertises for recruits.

While Dr. ElBaradei's two-day visit will focus attention on Israel's nuclear program, Israeli analysts say they see no possibility that it will lead Israel to change its policy of "strategic ambiguity."

"These policies have been followed by all prime ministers; they enjoy wide support in the Israeli body politic, and are well understood by Israel's allies," said Uzi Arad, director of the Institute for Policy and Strategy at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, outside Tel Aviv.

Dr. ElBaradei's visit is likely to cover a variety of civilian nuclear issues, like nuclear medicine and safety regulations, Mr. Arad said.

Israel is a longstanding member of the International Atomic Energy Agency, but the country has never signed the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and has not allowed international inspectors to visit the Dimona reactor. Israel contends that its shrouded nuclear program serves as an effective deterrent in a region where several of its enemies have sought nuclear weapons.

It points to past nuclear projects in Iraq and Libya and contends that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons.

Dr. ElBaradei said a week ago that he would like all unconventional weapons removed from the Middle East. "Israel agrees with that, but they say it has to be after peace agreements," Dr. ElBaradei said. "My proposal is maybe we need to start to have a parallel dialogue on security at the same time when we're working on the peace process."

Israel's critics contend that Israel is able to maintain its clandestine program with the blessing of the United States. To date, the most detailed description of Israel's Dimona nuclear reactor has come from Mordechai Vanunu, a former technician at the plant. Mr. Vanunu was released from prison in April after serving almost 18 years for describing his work at the reactor and for smuggling out dozens of photos. His story was published in 1986 in The Sunday Times of London.

Meanwhile, there was more violence on Sunday. Palestinian gunmen shot and killed a Jewish settler when they riddled his car with bullets in the northern West Bank, Israeli authorities said. Israeli security forces shot and killed three Palestinians. One was a gunman trying to reach a Jewish settlement in the northern West Bank, the military said.

In the Gaza Strip, a young man was killed after being hit by Israeli fire while taking part in a stone-throwing clash with troops, Palestinian security officials said.

Also, the Israeli police shot dead a Palestinian man in Jerusalem after he drove a van at an officer and tried to run him over, the police said. The man then tried to flee on foot, and was shot after he refused warnings to stop, the police said.

Late Sunday night, Israel carried out two airstrikes against Palestinian metal workshops in Gaza City, according to the military and to Palestinian security officials. Several Palestinians were hurt. Israel said the workshops were used to make weapons, including rockets.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/05/international/middleeast/05mide.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

ARMS ISSUE

New York Times

July 7, 2004

Blair Says Illicit Weapons May Never Be Found, But 'We Know' Hussein Had Them

By Alan Cowell

LONDON, July 6 — Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain, America's closest ally in Iraq, said Tuesday that the unconventional weapons cited as the justification for the war against Saddam Hussein might never be found. It was the closest Mr. Blair has come to acknowledging that his central argument for the invasion last year in the face of widespread public opposition might never be proved true or false. His handling of the weapons issue has damaged his credibility and his popularity with voters, while his decision to support the American-led war is depicted as the defining event of his premiership.

"We know Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, but we know we haven't found them," Mr. Blair said, addressing senior government and opposition legislators at a routine meeting. "I have to accept we have not found them, that we may not find them."

He suggested that unlawful weapons "could have been removed, could have been hidden, they could have been destroyed." But he maintained that Mr. Hussein had been a threat and had been in breach of United Nations resolutions concerning unlawful weapons.

Mr. Blair declined to offer an apology for going to war as the junior partner in an alliance with the United States.

"I do not believe there was not a threat in relation to weapons of mass destruction," he said.

Mr. Blair's comments were taken by his political adversaries as evidence that his reasons for going to war were mistaken.

"The fact is we went to war for the wrong reasons," said Edward Leigh, a member of the opposition Conservatives who also supported the invasion of Iraq. "There was no threat at the relevant time. This is the defining issue of his premiership."

Mr. Blair was speaking eight days before an official inquiry by Lord Frederick Butler makes public a report into a range of concerns about Iraq's weapon systems.

The question of whether Mr. Hussein was, in fact, able to deploy biological, chemical or other unlawful weapons has been a delicate issue since the government published a report in September 2002 saying some unconventional weapons could have been made operational within 45 minutes.

In more than a year since the fall of the Hussein government, no such weapons have been discovered. But Mr. Blair said Tuesday that the fact that no unlawful weapons had been found did not mean that Mr. Hussein had not been a threat.

Underlying the dispute over Iraq is a sense among some Britons that Mr. Blair became too close to President Bush, offering support over Iraq but winning little in return.

Mr. Blair said Tuesday that his country had shown its influence in the strategy of transferring sovereignty to the interim Iraqi government and in other areas.

"If you look at what has happened in Iraq recently, I think we have a very great deal of influence," he said.

Mr. Blair's foes have also accused him of forfeiting his relationships with European allies as he pursues closer ties with the United States. He rejected that suggestion on Tuesday, saying he had a "good relationship" with the leaders of France and Germany. He emphasized, however, that he would not permit his relationship with the White House to be "subordinated to the interests of any other country."

He has also been assailed by critics for failing to secure the release of four Britons held by the American authorities at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. He answered that criticism on Tuesday by saying Britain did not have the "machinery" to ensure that the four detainees would not pose a security threat if they were handed over to Britain.

At the same time, though, he called the detention facilities at Guantánamo Bay an "anomaly that has at some point got to be brought to an end."

Mr. Blair's political fortunes have been dogged by the war in Iraq, leaving him struggling to climb back in his second term to the popularity that provided the sobriquet "Teflon Tony" in his first term, which began in 1997. But his status sometimes seems ambiguous in light of the options facing British voters.

For instance, an opinion survey published Tuesday in The Times of London said the number of Britons who thought that the war in Iraq was a "good thing" had fallen from 65 percent in April 2003, just after the invasion, to just under 40 percent.

At the same time, the survey, taken by telephone among 1,000 people 18 or older last weekend, showed that Mr. Blair's Labor Party had gained in popularity, with some 33 percent of the respondents saying they would vote Labor in a general election, compared with 31 percent in early June. The poll also showed that the Conservatives had been damaged by the relatively strong showing in recent European Parliament elections of the anti-European U.K. Independence Party.

Mr. Blair's own popularity seemed also to have recovered somewhat, according to the poll, giving him a clear edge over both Michael Howard, the Conservative leader, and Gordon Brown, the chancellor of the exchequer, who is seen as Mr. Blair's chief rival in the Labor Party.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/07/international/europe/07BLAI.html?pagewanted=all>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Washington Post
July 7, 2004
Pg. 16

U.S. Removed Radioactive Materials From Iraq Facility

By Walter Pincus, Washington Post Staff Writer

Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham announced yesterday that almost two tons of low-enriched uranium and about 1,000 radioactive samples used for research had been removed from Iraq's Tuwaitha Nuclear Center and brought to the United States for security reasons.

The airlift of the radioactive materials was completed June 23, Abraham said in a statement, "to keep potentially dangerous nuclear materials out of the hands of terrorists." Less sensitive radiological materials -- used for medical, agricultural or industrial purposes -- were left in Iraq, according to a Department of Energy statement.

The International Atomic Energy Agency, which in the prewar period had kept the Tuwaitha uranium under seal, was told in advance of the U.S. removal, as were Iraqi officials.

Tuwaitha was once the center of Saddam Hussein's nuclear weapons effort, but its equipment was dismantled at the direction of U.N. inspectors in the early 1990s as part of the agreement following Iraq's surrender in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. The U.N. inspectors removed highly enriched uranium that could be used for weapons and shipped it for storage in Russia. The low-enriched uranium was placed under seal in storage at Tuwaitha but under the control of the IAEA.

Before the U.S.-led coalition's invasion of Iraq, as the Bush administration alleged that Hussein had reconstituted his nuclear program, Tuwaitha was a target for U.S. intelligence.

In April 2003, just days after the statue of Hussein in Baghdad was pulled down, a U.S. Marine engineering company took a close look at Tuwaitha, which is 30 miles south of Baghdad. There they found guards had abandoned their posts and looters were roaming the giant facility. At one storage building, which later was found to hold radioactive samples used in research, the radiation levels were too high to enter safely, although the entrance door stood wide open.

A month later, the Pentagon rejected suggestions that U.N. inspectors be allowed to reenter Iraq but agreed the IAEA experts could return to secure the uranium that had been under its seal for years.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A32195-2004Jul6.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

New York Times

Israel Tries to Shift Focus During U.N. Visit

By GREG MYRE

Published: July 7, 2004

ERUSALEM, July 7 — The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei, came to Israel looking to open a dialogue on making the Middle East nuclear-free zone. But Israel, the only country in the region believed to have nuclear weapons, sought to put the focus on Iran's nuclear program during talks today.

"They're expressing concern about Iran," Mr. ElBaradei told reporters after talks in Tel Aviv with senior officials in Israel's Atomic Energy Commission, including the chairman, Gideon Frank.

Israeli security officials often refer to Iran's nuclear program as potentially the most serious threat facing Israel, though Iran asserts that its program is intended solely for power generation, and not for nuclear weapons.

Under its policy of "strategic ambiguity," Israel has always refused to say whether it does or does not have nuclear weapons, and government officials have made clear that Mr. ElBaradei's visit will not bring about any change in that policy.

Mr. ElBaradei, in turn, said he did not have the authority to pressure Israel on this issue, though he would like to see nuclear issues discussed more openly in the Middle East, with the aim of creating a region free of weapons of mass destruction.

"I obviously don't have a magic wand," Mr. ElBaradei said. "But I think we need the security dialogue, and the sooner we start this the better."

A spokesman for Israel's secretive Atomic Energy Commission declined to comment on today's talks.

Israel established its nuclear program in the early 1950's and various estimates have said that Israel has produced enough plutonium to make up to 200 nuclear weapons.

Israel's critics argue that the country has been able to maintain its atomic program for a half-century, with the tacit backing of the United States, while other countries in the region have faced tremendous international pressure to abandon any nuclear aspirations.

In Tehran, the Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman, Hamid Reza Asefi, said Israel was trying to deflect attention from its nuclear program.

"The Zionist regime's claims about Iran's nuclear program are aimed at veiling its own nuclear activity and avoiding revealing its nuclear secrets to the I.A.E.A.," he said on Iranian state television, in a dispatch by Reuters.

Dan Schueftan, a security expert at the Shalem Center, an Israeli research institute, said Israel was feeling "zero pressure" at present to change its nuclear policies.

"Should Israel be polite to ElBaradei? Certainly. Should Israel use positive language? Yes. Does Israel have any motivation to change its position? Absolutely not," Mr. Schueftan said. "And ElBaradei understands this."

"From the Israeli point of view, the only thing that would matter would be American pressure," he added.

Last month, Mr. ElBaradei and his agency rebuked Iran for its lack of cooperation with inspectors from the United Nations agency.

"Iran's cooperation has not been as full, timely and proactive as it should have been," the agency resolution said. Mr. ElBaradei called on Iran to clear up lingering questions within "the next few months."

However, Israeli officials believe that Iran is committed to seeking nuclear weapons, and they assert that this potential threat requires an Israel deterrent.

Israel's military intelligence chief, Maj. Gen. Aharon Zeevi-Farkash, told Israeli television that he believed that Iran could develop a nuclear bomb by 2008 unless its program were stopped by the international community.

Israeli officials note that Iran has signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which requires the country to open its nuclear facilities to international inspectors.

Israel has always refused to sign the treaty, and has never permitted outside inspections of its nuclear reactor near the southern desert town of Dimona. Mr. ElBaradei said upon his arrival Tuesday that he would like Israel to sign the treaty.

Mr. ElBaradei, who has previously visited Israel, wraps up his visit on Thursday. He is to meet Israel's prime minister, Ariel Sharon, and deliver a speech at Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

In another development today, the international sponsors of a Mideast peace plan, known collectively as the Quartet, met the Palestinian prime minister, Ahmed Qurei, and urged the Palestinians to introduce reforms of the security services.

"The envoys stressed that the Palestinian Authority must make progress on its security-related obligations," the Quartet said in a statement, which referred to the road map, the peace plan that was introduced last summer but that quickly stalled.

The Quartet, which consists of the United States, the United Nations, Russia and the European Union, said Israel's proposal to withdraw soldiers and Jewish settlers from the Gaza Strip offered a possibility of reviving the road map. Israeli officials said the government had no plans to meet with the Quartet at present. However, Christina Gallach, a spokeswoman for the European Union's foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, said Israel had canceled a scheduled meeting, The Associated Press reported.

In the West Bank city of Nablus, the Israeli military said soldiers shot dead an armed Palestinian who belonged to Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/07/international/middleeast/07CND-MIDE.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Washington Times

July 7, 2004

Pg. 1

Israeli Nuclear Foe Still Fighting

Vanunu invites U.N. watchdog

By Paul Martin, The Washington Times

JERUSALEM — Israeli nuclear whistleblower Mordechai Vanunu demanded last night that he be allowed to brief the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei, who was making a rare visit to the Jewish state.

Mr. Vanunu, the technician who served 17 years in an Israeli prison for revealing details of the country's nuclear secrets, also told The Washington Times that Mr. ElBaradei is failing to adequately investigate and criticize Israel's nuclear program.

It was the first time Mr. Vanunu has spoken to an American news organization since he left prison. Under the terms of his release, he is barred from speaking to foreigners, entering Internet chat rooms or approaching foreign embassies.

Last month, he made remarks to the British Broadcasting Corp., causing a journalist to be arrested by police and barred from returning to Israel.

Nevertheless, Mr. Vanunu chose the occasion of Mr. ElBaradei's visit to make a dramatic and, in his own view, "very risky" entry into the discussion.

A representative of an international news agency was also present for a short period during The Times' encounter with Mr. Vanunu, which lasted several hours.

The former technician complained that Mr. ElBaradei had made no effort to get in touch with him, even though the media has widely reported his whereabouts in East Jerusalem.

Mr. Vanunu urged the chief of the U.N. nuclear watchdog to demand entrance to the Dimona reactor, where he had worked and secretly photographed several underground and top-secret floors, including a plutonium-processing facility and what scientists later said was a model for a nuclear bomb.

He shared these secrets with the Sunday Times of London in 1986, and was later lured to Rome by an attractive woman, where Israeli agents kidnapped him.

"I think ElBaradei is operating in secret with [the Israelis]," Mr. Vanunu said yesterday. "All he'll hear in his planned meetings with Prime Minister [Ariel] Sharon and the others will be propaganda and disinformation." In a gesture of openness, Israel this week placed on a Web site the first photos of its nuclear plant, other than the more detailed ones taken by Mr. Vanunu in his last months at Dimona.

Responding to the ElBaradei visit, Mr. Sharon said Israel would continue to maintain its silence over whether it possesses nuclear weapons, even though the world's major intelligence agencies estimate Israel has up to 240 nuclear devices.

"I don't know what [Mr. ElBaradei] is coming to see," Mr. Sharon said. "Israel has to hold in its hand all the elements of power necessary to protect itself by itself."

"Our policy of ambiguity on nuclear arms has proved its worth, and it will continue," Mr. Sharon said.

Mr. ElBaradei urged Israel in December to dismantle its nuclear arsenal. But Israel has never signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, designed to prevent the global spread of atomic weapons.

While Israel's failure to sign means it is ineligible to receive technical aid and equipment for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, it also frees the country from inspections or sanctions by Mr. Baradei's agency.

Mr. Vanunu said Mr. ElBaradei owes it to the world to demand entry to the bottom five floors of Dimona and said U.S. lawmakers were duped in the 1960s when they visited the plant but were shown only the top few floors.

"The Israelis even built false walls at some points," he said.

Mr. Vanunu said Israel had erred in believing it could defuse Arab threats by building nuclear weapons. "It was a very bad policy led by Peres in the 1950s," Mr. Vanunu said, referring to Shimon Peres, the former foreign minister and prime minister.

"They believed they could make peace through nuclear weapons. Yet since those days, the weapons have been the source of all the wars."

Mr. Vanunu is a hero to some in Israel and the international community, but is considered a traitor by many of his countrymen.

He said he could have understood if Israel had produced only a handful of thermonuclear weapons, but not the vast array he suspected was being produced in Dimona.

He conceded that he had never seen any weapons, nor had anyone ever mentioned weapons production during his years at the plant. But he photographed a model that he says he recognized as a mock-up of a neutron bomb. He believes Israel has also developed hydrogen bombs.

"Having a conventional nuclear weapon may have been a deterrent," he said, referring to Arab declarations to destroy the Jewish state. "But I grew alarmed when I realized just how much Israel was producing."

He said he still believes that if Israel had not developed its nuclear arsenal, the Arab states would not have been able to produce their own. "No foreign power would have helped the Arabs," he said.

He acknowledged that Israelis felt safer in the belief that their warheads will deter Arabs from dreams of total conquest. But he believes that if the full extent of Israel's weaponry were known inside Israel, it would produce a change in policy.

"Israelis are psychologically brainwashed — by their leaders and by media incitement," he said. "But I believe Israeli citizens will be against genocidal weapons if they heard the truth."

"I believe even now Israel should disarm its nuclear weapons," he said.

<http://www.washtimes.com/world/20040706-115347-8674r.htm>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)